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# Howard Interviews Stalin

How the AP, UP and TASS Smashed the International News Cartel

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# Howard Interviews Stalin How the AP, UP and TASS Smashed the International News Cartel

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Terhi Rantanen was a visiting scholar at the School of Journalism, Indiana University-Bloomington, from November 14-18, 1993, and also from October 31 to November 12, 1991. She did research for this monograph and her previous one (Number 2, 1992) in the Roy W. Howard Archive in the School of Journalism's library and also at the Lilly Library here in Bloomington. She is presently Acting Associate Professor in the Department of Communication, Helsinki University, Finland. Her interests are in the relationship between international and national news agencies in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and she has also written on the history of U.S. and Finnish news agencies. She has done research on news agencies in archives in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Stockholm, Paris, London, Washington D.C., and at Harvard University, Indiana University, Stanford University, and the University of Illinois. She holds a master's degree in communication, a licentiate in communication, and a doctorate in communication, all from Helsinki University in Finland. This monograph was edited by David H. Weaver, Roy W. Howard Research Professor at Indiana University's School of Journalism.

## Acknowledgements

This project started in 1982 when I visited Moscow under an exchange program between the Department of Communication at Helsinki University and the Faculty of Journalism at Moscow University. My original idea was to study TASS's foreign relations, but I ended up doing research on foreign news in Imperial Russia. After times changed, the old idea became possible. Due to the longevity of the project, I am grateful to many people and institutions, with apologies if any names have been omitted.

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- Number 1 Jan Wieten, "Howard and Northcliffe: Two Press Lords on the Warpath," April 23, 1990, pp. 1-44.
- Number 2 Terhi Rantanen, "Mr. Howard Goes to South America: The United Press Associations and Foreign Expansion," May 15, 1992, pp. 1-32.
- Number 3 Terhi Rantanen, "Howard Interviews Stalin: How the AP, UP and TASS Smashed the International News Cartel," May 16, 1994, pp. 1-52.

In 1936 Roy W. Howard, the general business director of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers and former president of the United Press Associations (UP), interviewed Josef Stalin, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> This interview aroused unpredicted attention,<sup>2</sup> because Stalin revealed the Soviet Union's attitude toward the possible war with Japan and Germany, and spoke at length about Soviet-American relations. It was also the first interview given by Stalin to foreign media in two years.<sup>3</sup>

The interview was released under unusual circumstances. It was delivered personally by W. W. Hawkins (the general manager of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers) simultaneously to the representatives of the UP, the Associated Press (AP) and TASS. As Kenneth Durant, the New York representative of TASS, wrote:

In handing copies, Mr. Hawkins said: "You will observe that this interview is given on equal terms to the UP and the AP, and to them only. It is not given to the Hearst agency. That was the arrangement, I do not know why."<sup>4</sup> (This last sentence ironically, with a wink indicating that Hawkins knew very well why.)

Why, indeed? Why was Howard allowed to interview Stalin? Why did the UP share its major scoop voluntarily with the AP, but not with International News Agency (INS), which was owned by the Hearst papers? The fact that Howard's agency, UP, was one of the first foreign agencies to sign an agreement with the new-born ROSTA (later TASS) agency of Soviet-Russia in 1922 probably influenced the Soviet decision to grant the interview. As a matter of fact, both American agencies—the UP and later the AP—had a special relationship with ROSTA/TASS. This arose in spite of the fact that the U.S. and Soviet-Russia still did not have diplomatic ties, and the general political atmosphere between the two countries was far from friendly.



FIGURE 1

Source: Roy W. Howard Archive, School of Journalism, Indiana University

This essay explores the background to the famous interview and its release to the U.S. agencies that were in fierce competition with each other. It also examines the relations between three national news agencies in two countries — the U.S. privately owned UP, the cooperatively owned AP, and the Soviet state-owned ROSTA (Rossiiskoe telegraf-noe agentstvo, the Russian Telegraph Agency) that was later changed into TASS (Telegrafnoe agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union).

In the early 1920s, all three were still national agencies—in contrast to the British Reuters and the French Havas (AFP's predecessor), which were international agencies that dominated the world's news market and divided it into exclusive territories. At this time, the American agencies had started their foreign expansion whereas ROSTA/TASS was only beginning its operations. However, ROSTA/TASS was to play a major part in the battle by U.S. agencies against the European news cartel, which was finally crushed through joint action in 1934. Ultimately, the AP, UP and TASS were all to join Reuters and AFP as international news agencies after World War II.

This monograph is based mainly on the correspondence of news agency executives. It draws primarily on letters between Kenneth Durant, the director of the ROSTA/TASS office in New York, and Jakob G. Doletzky,<sup>5</sup> the general manager of ROSTA/TASS in Moscow. From 1923 until 1939, ROSTA/TASS depended wholly on the U.S. journalists in its New York office.6 Durant dutifully and vividly described his conversations with Karl Bickel (general manager of the UP) and Kent Cooper (general manager of the AP) on news agency relations in letters to his chief executive, "Comrade Doletzky". These materials come chiefly from the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (The State Archive of the Russian Federation) in Moscow,<sup>7</sup> but also from the Roy W. Howard Archive at the School of Journalism and the Kent Cooper papers in the Lilly Library (both at Indiana University in Bloomington). This essay also draws upon materials from the Reuters archive in London, the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress and the National Archives (both in Washington,

D.C.), the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheshii Arkhiv (The Russian State Historical Archive) in St. Petersburg, and the Archives Nationales in Paris.

FIGURE 2 Roy Howard Arrives in Moscow in 1936



Roy W. Howard Arrives in Moscow, March 1936. Left to right: B. Denel, UP correspondent; Ben Foster, Howard's secretary; I. E. Chernov, head of the Foreign Information Department of TASS; Roy W. Howard, Chairman of the Board, Scripps-Howard Newspapers

Source: Editor & Publisher, March 14, 1936

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## THE BIRTH OF ROSTA/TASS

From 1904 on, Imperial Russia had one dominant news agency, the state-owned St. Petersburg (Petrograd) Telegraph Agency (PTA). It was subsidized and operated under the direct control of the government. Its foreign news transmission (like that of prerevolutionary predecessors) was contractually dependent on the German Wolff agency,

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to whom the cartel had assigned the territory of St. Petersburg and Moscow. The latter system had deep roots: Havas and Reuters had divided up the world's news market with Wolff since 1859.<sup>8</sup> Despite the PTA's numerous efforts, it could not sever its dependence on Wolff before the outbreak of World War I when Havas and Reuters replaced Wolff as the PTA's foreign news supplier.<sup>9</sup>

On October 24-25, 1917, Bolshevik forces seized all strategic points in St. Petersburg such as railway stations, bridges, the telephone company, the national bank — and the telegraph. A unit headed by a sailor named Leonid Stark also captured the Petrograd Telegraph Agency and took control of its news transmission; Stark sent the first telegram from the captured agency on the same day.<sup>10</sup> Two days later the Military Revolutionary Committee issued a decree that temporarily forbade the publication of bourgeois newspapers and counterrevolutionary publications. Further, it confiscated the paper supply, machinery and buildings of the bourgeois press. The PTA was reorganized and its old staff was fired.<sup>11</sup>

On December 1, 1917, the PTA was changed into an official information agency that operated under the Council of People's Commissars.<sup>12</sup> The PTA was made responsible for capital, provincial and foreign news. Parallel to the PTA, the new Soviet government established its own Press Bureau (Biuro pechati) to deliver official news to the press. When the Soviet government moved to Moscow in in March 1918, both agencies followed. After the regime closed the few remaining non-bolshevik newspapers, two private news agencies that operated earlier were also suppressed. The government decided to close the Press Bureau and merge it with the PTA. The result was a new agency — the Russian Telegraph Agency (Rossiiskoe telegrafnoe agentstvo, or ROSTA) on September 7, 1918.<sup>13</sup>

Stark became the first commissar of the agency,<sup>14</sup> but a new director, P. M. Kerzhentsev, was appointed in 1919.<sup>15</sup> In early 1919 ROSTA had only three departments: Russian, administrative-financial, and telegraph (later changed into the foreign department). There was not much foreign news, because the agency did not have its own correspondents or relations with foreign agencies, but used radio to pick up foreign news.<sup>16</sup> One of its main tasks was to organize an extensive domestic net of correspondents, which was completed by 1920. ROSTA also started to publish its own newspapers and journals. Because of the great shortage in paper, ROSTA invented the so-called ROSTA windows — a combination of text and drawings that were placed in shop windows.<sup>17</sup> It resorted to other unconventional methods of news transmission, such as agitational trains and ships. ROSTA even started to educate new journalists by organizing journalism schools.<sup>18</sup> In short, it was primarily a domestic news agency that concentrated on spreading political propaganda.

In 1921 ROSTA's director, Kerzhentsev, was replaced by J. G. Doletzky, a professional revolutionary who had been a member of the Bolshevik Executive Committee in Petrograd in 1917.<sup>19</sup> The agency that he inherited could hardly be called a news agency. Karl Bickel described his first visit to ROSTA in 1923:

I doubt if they had over one or two telephones in the whole layout and they weren't used particularly—if at all—in the collection of news. The employees were largely tucked away in offices and did their essays and observations in a high degree of remoteness. In Russia reporters of the American type were nonexistent; if they had existed they'd have been instantly arrested in both the old or new government. If the various governments had anything to report such as a battle or disturbance or any change in internal domestic policy or banking or in tax policy, the department sent over their copy and unless they sent it over nothing was ever printed. To print without this formal governmental permission was just out of a Russian's mind—it was, at that time, largely beyond their general comprehension.

It was Doletzky who sought to reorganize ROSTA into a modern news agency. Under his leadership ROSTA abandoned many of its former activities, including most of its publications and journalism train-

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ing. The agency now had several departments, of which the foreign department was the largest (with 27 employees). In 1918-1919 it had already established its first foreign offices in Berlin, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Oslo.<sup>21</sup> Doletzky also expanded the agency's network of foreign correspondents. Many of them were actually foreigners — including Kenneth Durant, who was selected to head ROSTA's New York bureau in 1923.<sup>22</sup> By 1924 ROSTA had offices in London, Paris, Berlin, New York and Vienna together with 20 correspondents around the world.<sup>23</sup>

ROSTA's foreign transmission remained strictly supervised by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel). Already in 1918 a department of Soviet propaganda was established in the Narkomindel. This department first gathered all the foreign information and then organized the net of ROSTA's first foreign correspondents. When ROSTA got its own foreign department, it still operated under G. V. Chicherin, Commissar of Foreign Affairs. If foreign agencies sought contacts with ROSTA, for example, they had to turn to Chicherin<sup>24</sup> or the director of international propaganda Karl Radek. Radek later became secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern) and was a long-time member of ROSTA's (TASS's) board of directors.<sup>25</sup>

Still, despite ROSTA's close connections with the government, its reorganization based on government ownership was not self-evident. In 1924 an article, published in *Izvestiia* with a title "We Need Associated Press", suggested that ROSTA should be owned jointly by Soviet newspapers.<sup>26</sup> The result was, however, that in 1925 ROSTA was renamed TASS and remained in state ownership. It enjoyed a total monopoly, i.e., no other agency except TASS (and its branch offices) was to gather and disseminate news inside the Soviet Union. Its general manager was appointed by the government.<sup>27</sup>

## THE AP AND THE UP

The different Associated Presses had been affiliated with the same

European news agency cartel as the agencies in Imperial Russia. While Moscow and St. Petersburg belonged to the exclusive territory of the Wolff agency, North America was divided between Havas, Reuters and Wolff. In practice, in the early years this meant that neither the AP nor the Russian agencies could operate outside their home territories and could only deliver news to the cartel members.

However, the AP started systematically to build its foreign correspondent net in the 1890s. It also managed to achieve a concession from the cartel in 1893 when it was allowed to operate in Central America, and again in 1918 when it achieved a free hand in South America, which was Havas's territory.<sup>28</sup>

In contrast to the AP, the United Press Associations (UP), founded in 1907, operated outside the European news cartel. Originally, the UP confined its news transmission chiefly to the domestic market. Later, it established a foreign correspondent net of its own, signed contracts with small foreign agencies unaffiliated with the cartel, and also sold its news service directly to newspapers. More important was the step taken in 1916, when the UP started selling news to the Buenos Aires newspaper *La Nación*. The AP followed the UP to South America and after the two agencies had competed fiercely against each other, they both achieved a foothold there. World War I marked a watershed in the UP's foreign expansion. The UP started to sign contracts directly with European and Asian newspapers and also became interested in the Russian market<sup>29</sup>

Thus the AP and the UP followed different strategies in their foreign expansion. The AP was affiliated with the cartel (which was now called the League of Allied News Agencies), where it gradually improved its position. In 1927, it even signed a four-party agreement with Havas, Reuters and Wolff that recognized its equal status and its superiority over the other Allied News Agencies.<sup>30</sup> The UP, on the other hand, found its partners among other small national agencies that operated outside the cartel. The interests of these two coalitions — "official" (most of the members of the Allied News Agencies were government-owned or supported) and "independent" (of which the UP

was the most notable), clashed on several occasions.<sup>31</sup> The UP was considered the most dangerous threat not only to the AP, but to the European news cartel as well.<sup>32</sup>

The AP's first general manager was Melville Stone, who started the agency's foreign expansion by establishing a wide net of correspondents abroad. Kent Cooper was appointed the third general manager in 1925 after having been assistant general manager since 1920.<sup>33</sup> Cooper's first foreign assignment came with the AP's expansion into South America in 1918, and afterward he was the AP's main negotiator with foreign agencies. Roy W. Howard was the UP president who engineered the UP's foreign expansion by signing the first foreign direct contract.<sup>34</sup> He resigned in 1920 to become the general business director of the Scripps newspapers (later Scripps-Howard Newspapers). After W. W. Hawkins,<sup>35</sup> Karl Bickel was elected president of the UP in 1923.<sup>36</sup> It was Bickel who completed the UP's foreign expansion. Russia became one of his first tasks.<sup>37</sup>

## THE UP'S AGREEMENT WITH ROSTA

After the February Revolution in 1917, the Russian news agency PTA once again tried to break its contractual dependence on the news cartel. The Russian government considered that it could not contemplate the maintenance of the PTA's relations with Havas and Reuters unless there was equality between the contracting parties, i.e., exchange of service without payment and liberty of action outside its home territory.<sup>38</sup> The UP had already sent its representatives in 1916 to negotiate an agreement with the PTA, but without results.<sup>39</sup> When the UP approached the PTA after the February Revolution, it managed to convince the Russian agency that it served "all the democratic, labor, and people's papers in America, while the AP was the servant of the capitalists." The PTA decided to make an agreement with the UP. However, Reuters' and Havas' negotiators insisted that the PTA reject the UP overtures; finally the PTA capitulated and did not sign an agreement with the UP.<sup>40</sup>

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After the October Revolution the situation changed again. Havas's and Reuters' attitude towards the PTA, "which was now in the hands of Maximalists," was suspicious, but their policy was to maintain the relationship. But in early 1918 the internal chaos caused a breakdown in communications. When the PTA closed down operations, ROSTA was left without any connection to the cartel.<sup>41</sup> The UP was nevertheless persistent and early in 1919 attempted again to enter into negotiations with G. V. Chicherin, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, but he refused to grant visas to the UP correspondents.<sup>42</sup> Frank J. Taylor, UP's Berlin correspondent, nevertheless entered Russia illegally. He managed to visit Chicherin and the ROSTA office and persuaded the agency officials to buy the UP report.<sup>43</sup> Ultimately, however, the UP office in New York ignored the arrangement.<sup>44</sup>

In 1919 the UP was approached by a representative of ROSTA, who offered a proposal for the UP to serve ROSTA with its world-wide report. He sought to arrange for a 1000-word daily report, for which ROSTA would pay \$1200 weekly.<sup>45</sup> Given the American intervention in the Civil War against the Soviet State, the UP felt obliged to ask the State Department whether the establishment of this service to Russia would embarrass either the State Department or the UP. The UP claimed that ROSTA was also simultaneously negotiating with other foreign news agencies, and hence it was merely a question of whether ROSTA would obtain news from an American, British or French agency. The State Department raised no objections, but admonished the UP to be very careful: the Department evidently suspected some furtive purpose on ROSTA's part.<sup>46</sup>

Simultaneously, International News Agency (INS), represented in Moscow by Louise Bryant, proposed its own agreement to ROSTA in 1922.<sup>47</sup> The INS application asserted that the Hearst newspapers had been more favorable to Soviet Russia than any other agency. The AP, it argued, was out of the question, for it served only the most capitalistic of the American press, and its organization had been unrelentingly hostile to the Soviet government. The INS also claimed that the UP merely served a smaller number of the papers of the same bourgeois

Advertisement

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FIGURE 3

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
class, mostly evening newspapers. The INS proposed a contract for five years.<sup>48</sup>

Ideology and class allegiance notwithstanding, ROSTA nevertheless signed a contract with the UP, not the INS. The agreement was initialed in Moscow in 1922 by John Graudenz<sup>49</sup> (the correspondent of the UP) and Doletzky. It was an exclusive agreement in the sense that neither party could send news to any other agency. The contract was made for a period of one year, but could be prolonged automatically.<sup>50</sup> Earlier in 1922, ROSTA had already signed agreements with the German agencies Telegraphen-Union and Wolff.<sup>51</sup>

The UP policy toward ROSTA was consistent with its actions in other countries: the UP operated independently, signing agreements wherever it found potential customers. The UP held that news was purely a commodity and that the agency was a frankly commercial organization, a business enterprise that bought and sold news for profit.<sup>52</sup> In that sense, it emulated the attitude of American businessmen, who took an interest in the Russian markets, even though the two countries did not have diplomatic relations. As a result, extensive contacts grew up in the 1920s between individual American firms and the Soviet government.<sup>53</sup>

## THE AGREEMENT WITH THE CARTEL

The situation in the international news market had changed considerably: the German Wolff had lost its status as an international agency (it was forced to operate mainly inside the boundaries of its home territory), but still remained a member of the cartel agreement. Havas and especially Reuters were now at the height of their power and, together, they controlled the Allied News Agencies by their mutual agreements. The relations between UP and ROSTA appeared to be developing satisfactorily. ROSTA considered the UP to be a "progressive agency with political immaculateness,"<sup>54</sup> its services good, and its attitude toward the Russian-American rapprochement positive. The agencies' general managers Bickel and Doletzky had met each other and



& Publisher, August 1921

Source: Editor

expressed their mutual respect in several letters.

The situation was far from satisfactory for the AP. While Reuters refused to have anything to do with ROSTA, the AP was confronted by a situation where its main domestic rival had access to ROSTA's news, and the AP had to rely entirely on its own correspondent. Earlier, the AP had inquired about Reuters' and Havas' position with ROSTA, but Reuters preferred not to sign any agreement. In 1923, at the AP's behest, Reuters approached the German Wolff agency (which had a contract with ROSTA) to find out whether it would be possible to have a direct or indirect contact with <sup>55</sup> At first, Reuters and the AP planned to receive news from Moscow through Wolff; an invitation was extended to Havas to join the arrangement. Havas, however, had started its own negotiations with ROSTA.<sup>56</sup> Doletzky gave this explanation of the situation:

Like all our nearest collaborators you must have had no doubt of the necessity for the ROSTA to settle relations with other official and semi-official agencies [...] The key to a normal intercourse and reciprocal exchange between ROSTA and these agencies, that would reflect the diplomatic and economic relations of the USSR and the European countries, lies exclusively in a mutual arrangement and formal agreement between both parties and therefore the concerned authorities have suggested to accept the proposals of Havas and Reuters.<sup>57</sup>

Further, the fact that the League of the Allied Agencies consisted of 23 member agencies must have had an effect on the decision, which was made not by ROSTA but by "governmental circles." The UP was sure that ROSTA was being forced to sunder this agreement. According to Bickel:

I do not think there is any question but that Doletzky was forced to negotiate and to close with Reuters and Havas, etc., by the Foreign Office [Commissariat of Foreign Affairs]. The presidium, which acts as a board of directors for ROSTA, is made up of two delegates from ROSTA, two from the Foreign Office, and Karl Radek, who acts as a buffer between the Foreign Office and ROSTA. [...] Generally speaking the Foreign Office would be willing to trade ROSTA in return for diplomatic concessions that they might desire from France and England.<sup>58</sup>

The UP even suspected that the Russian Foreign Office decided that a connection with Havas and Reuters was imperative in order to promote commercial relations with England and France, and that the British Foreign Office may have pressed Reuters.<sup>59</sup> However, ROSTA itself seemed to support the change and agreed "with the fundamental principle of the Allied agencies and their *raison d'etre* of non-renewing agreements with agencies competing with the Allied interests." In ROSTA's case, this meant a break with the UP. ROSTA considered that the "blockade of information" concerning Russia ended with the signing of the new agreement with the cartel. It was now "recognized de jure as a telegraph agency by the bourgeois agencies."<sup>60</sup>

ROSTA did not enter the negotiations with Havas without reservations. S. Carey Clements of Reuters was hastily invited to Paris to assist in the Havas' negotiations with Doletzky. ROSTA did not want a single agreement with all the allied agencies, but separate contracts with the individual agencies that it itself chose. ROSTA agreed to pay the commission, but refused to accept restrictions on the delivery of its news to such countries as Turkey, China, Japan, Persia and Afghanistan. This contradicted the rule of the cartel, which had restricted the operations of national agencies to their home territories. The sole exception had been the AP, which had achieved a free hand to operate in South America.

Clements of Reuters did not seem to care if ROSTA delivered its "propaganda" to Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and China so long as the agency confined itself to Russian news and did not seek to establish a general news service in these countries. As for Japan, where ROSTA had unsuccessfully attempted to reach an agreement with the Kokusai

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agency (because of political conflicts between the two countries), the question was more problematic. ROSTA insisted on its right to continue delivering news directly to Japanese newspapers. But Clements adamantly opposed any concession in Japan: Kokusai was Reuters' ally and direct transmission to newspapers was out of the question. Finally, Clements and Doletzky agreed that ROSTA should not enter into an alliance with any Japanese agency other than Kokusai, and that it should make its arrangement as soon as possible. A similar arrangement was later made with Kokusai's successor, Rengo.<sup>61</sup>

In addition, Reuters and Havas also agreed to put a desk in their offices at the disposal of ROSTA's representatives, while ROSTA undertook to do the same for Reuters' and Havas's representatives in Moscow.<sup>62</sup> In sum, ROSTA entered the League of Allied Agencies and even achieved two major concessions from it: the right to sign direct agreements with national agencies and to deliver its news outside its home territory.<sup>63</sup> All this happened seven months before France and England acknowledged Soviet Russia.<sup>64</sup>

There is a certain contradiction in ROSTA's actions in relationship to the news cartel. The Russian news agencies had throughout their history tried to emancipate themselves from the cartel's power. When the time came, the desire of the Soviet government to facilitate a resumption of diplomatic relations with France and Germany took precedence over resistance to the cartel. The Soviet decision also shows how powerful the cartel still was. These negotiations also involved foreign ministries. Hence the cartel was more than an alliance of news agencies, and conferred a quasi-official status on its members.

However, ROSTA did show some independence in the negotiations with the cartel. It signed individual contracts directly with national agencies affiliated with the cartel (in addition to its agreement with Reuters and Havas), and this came to be known as the "TASS principle of independent action" or "TASS policy."<sup>65</sup> Later, Bickel, Cooper and Iwanaga (the director of the Rengo agency) all referred to ROSTA's contract as a model of equal relations between national agencies.<sup>66</sup>

## THE AP AGREEMENT WITH ROSTA

ROSTA's agreement with Havas and Reuters encouraged the AP to establish direct contacts with ROSTA (and it signed an agreement with it), just as the UP lost ROSTA's news service.<sup>67</sup> ROSTA's New York office, earlier located in the UP building, now moved to the AP building. However, the UP correspondent in Moscow was extended special courtesy because of the agency's previous good relations with ROSTA.<sup>68</sup>

The AP was now closely working with the news cartel, and it even planned a defensive-offensive alliance with Reuters against the UP. When the AP signed the first four-party-treaty with Havas, Reuters and Wolff in 1927, it was accepted as a full member of the cartel and granted its own territories.<sup>69</sup> As a sign of good relations, the AP sent Kent Cooper to participate in the conference of the League of the Allied Agencies in Warsaw in 1927.<sup>70</sup> On this trip Cooper visited several European agencies, including TASS.

It remains unclear why Cooper's attitude toward the cartel changed after 1927. One possible reason stemmed from a trip to Europe, where he found the operations of most members of the League of the Allied Agencies unsatisfactory. Further, many of the European agencies were either state-owned or closely operating with the government. While the UP advertised its independence, the AP's reputation was in jeopardy because of its close ties to state agencies.<sup>71</sup> Secondly, once the AP obtained a free hand in South America, it demanded the same in the Far East, where the UP already had a strong foothold. But the Far East was Reuters' territory. Reuters was far superior to Havas as an international agency and had no intention of surrendering its exclusive claim over this region. The clash between the AP and Reuters became inevitable.

Both the U.S. agencies highly valued their relations with TASS. Because the U.S. did not have diplomatic ties with Soviet Russia, the information concerning Russia was considered especially important. Specifically in news agency relations, as the tensions between the AP

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and Reuters increased, the AP tried to establish closer contacts with those national agencies that it considered potential allies. The two most important were the Japanese Rengo and the Soviet TASS. It was even claimed that the agreement with TASS was the only agreement that had any commercial value to the AP.<sup>72</sup> Both these agencies had displayed independence in negotiations with the cartel. According to Cooper, the European members of the League of the Allied Agencies, with the exception of TASS, were mere vassals of Reuters.<sup>73</sup> Of course, the fact that Russia was the only country from which the UP was excluded, but which accorded the AP access, was the principal factor.

Although the UP had lost its contract with ROSTA, it did not give up. The UP customary strategy was to establish direct contracts with newspapers, but that was obviously impossible in Soviet Russia, given TASS's state monopoly and a state-owned press. Nevertheless, the UP maintained warm relations with TASS and closely watched its development. In 1927 the UP correspondent in Moscow approached Doletzky with an agreement proposal. It quoted Bickel, who wrote:

If the TASS agency came to us today and offered us a monopoly agreement on the same basis and of the same character that they are serving to the AP now, and agreed to exclude the AP and all other press associations, I would not accept the proposition. The UP wants only to be on the basis of its competitors in the matter of having news made available. It wants only an equal chance with them to get the news.<sup>74</sup>

However, TASS found its relationship to the AP totally satisfactory. It even considered the AP superior to the UP, claiming that "the reactionary AP has actually been much more scrupulous and correct in its general editorial policy than the 'liberal' UP." The latter, "although more friendly and sympathetic in its pretension, published the most outrageous canards from sources outside the USSR. This simply means that the AP, with its old tradition of international and interagency contracts, is more responsible and more serious."<sup>75</sup>

TASS was especially pleased that the AP did not distribute news about internal conditions in the USSR from Riga, Warsaw, Helsinki or other sources of "white propaganda". However, the AP remained "a bourgeois news agency, indeed the most reactionary agency in the U.S."<sup>76</sup>

The UP proposal brought both Bickel and Cooper to Russia on separate occasions in 1927. For Bickel, this visit was seemingly only a good-will gesture, because he did not raise anew the question of breaking up with the cartel and signing an agreement with the UP.<sup>77</sup> For Cooper, it was his first trip to Russia and his first meeting with Doletzky.<sup>78</sup> Durant sent preliminary information on Cooper to Doletzky:

You'll find Cooper quite different from Bickel—less frank, less naive, and with no pretensions on liberalism. Cooper is more the type of conservative, ruthless, aggressive American businessman. Yet these characteristics have in no way interfered with the establishment of satisfactory relations between the Bureau and the AP. I should say that the "official" relations—as distinguished from the personal relations—are even better than they are with UP. The AP is entirely correct in its attitude towards us, completely adheres to the terms of the contract, in ways which I have previously describedto you, to be friendly and conciliatory to TASS. This is all the more remarkable because of the very fact that Cooper and the AP editors in general are of the most conservative type, deeply antagonistic to the Soviet Union.<sup>79</sup>

Despite the fact that the AP was politically more conservative than the UP, it needed its contract with TASS as much as the UP did. The competition between the UP and AP led to a point where the two agencies competed over their relationship to TASS. The situation reached the point where Cooper checked the political correctness of the AP correspondents before their posting to Moscow and regretted that he could not support the establishment of formal diplomatic relations

## FIGURE 4 **Izvestiia on Cooper**

Вчера, 27 мая, в Москву прибыл генеральный директор американского телеграфного агентства «Ассошизйтед Пресс» г-н Кент Купер.

На воказале г-н Бупер был встречен ответственным руководителем ТАСС тов. Я. Г. Долециим, сотрудниками ТАСС и представителями всесоюзного общества. культурной связи с заграницей.

Примечание. Американское телеграф-ное агентство «Ассошивител Пресс», телеральным даректором которого являются прибывший в Москву г. Кент Куцер. представляет собой самое мощное в мире телеграфное агентство.

Оно организовано 34 года назад на кооперативных началах, и членами его являются 1.200 американских газет (всего в Америке имеется 1.800 ежедневных га-Det)

«Ассошизитед Пресс» передает в настоящее время ежелневно 80 тыс. слов. в то время как в 1918 г. оно передавало ежедневно только 40-50 тысяч слов. Из всей этой массы информации на долю внутренней информации приходится 75 проц. и на долю иностранной-только 20 проц. Конечно, ни одна газета не может ноглотить такой массы материала, но за-

ционный фонд, из которого она может дачей агентства является создать для ка-ждой обслуживаемой газеты информа- сует ее читателей. черпать тот материал, который нитере-

# Беседа с директором американского телеграфиого агентства "Ассошнэйтед Пресс" г. К. Купером.

В беседе с сотрудником «Известий, зать личное предположение, что в мас-ЦИК СОСР и ВЩИК» г. Купер сообщил се оно вполне благожелательно в СССР. следующее: Если в Соед. Штатах и наблютаются ино-

- Я приехал в Москву с той же гла выступления, носящие враждебный целью, с какой я ездил на межуународ- но отношению к СССР характер, то это ную конференцию телеграфных агентитв регистрируется именно потому, что такие в Варшаву. Эта цель состоит в том, что- выступления являются исключением на бы углубить и расширить информацию, фоне общего дружеского расположения. которую наше агентство получает из Нынешнее правительство Соед. Штатоз. европейских стран и в частности из вообще старается вести политику, не СССР. Опыт показал, что до сих пор на- обязывающую его по отношению к Евроша информация ограничивалась глав- пе. Но нет сомнений в том, что у таных образом передачей полнтических ких двух демократических стран, как сведений. Между тем многочисленные СССР и Соед. Штаты, может найгись читатели тех 1.200 газет, которые обслу- большое количество точек соприкоснореживаются нашим агентством, интересу- иня. В частности торговые, промышленются не только политическими вопроса- ные и иные деловые круги с интересом ия, но и вопросами быта, общественной следят за экономическим развитием СССР. жизна и т. д. Я приехал в Европу и в В их среде существует твердая уверел-СССР именно для того, чтобы изыскать ность, что экономические взаимоотноше-

The Soviet Newspaper Izvestiia's story on Cooper's journey to Moscow, May 28, 1927

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between the US and Soviet Union as openly as the UP because the AP members were more conservative.<sup>80</sup> TASS, of course, benefitted from the competition by simultaneously maintaining good relations with both the "conservative" AP and "liberal" UP.

## THE AP AND UP COMPETITION OVER SOVIET RUSSIA

In general, the European agencies showed relatively little interest in Russia. Neither Havas nor Reuters had correspondents there. They relied instead on the AP Moscow service. The U.S. had the largest group of correspondents in Moscow: the AP, UP, INS and the Jewish Telegraph Agency<sup>81</sup> together with three correspondents from newspapers. Although TASS was the only communist news agency in the world, it had made remarkable progress since its modest origins. As Eugene Lyons, the correspondent of the UP wrote:

There is only one news agency, strictly official. TASS, with J. G. Doletzky at its head. Although its tempo in news delivery is hardly American-having no competition it has no need for hurry-TASS is remarkably well organized and equipped in modern style. It delivers news by telegraph printers and by radio, combining the two methods with notable success. Through sixteen bureaus and its contracts with the allied official agencies of the world it obtains a world-wide report favorably comparable to that of any other agency in the world.<sup>82</sup>

After his visit to Russia in 1927, Cooper had expressed his wish that "the relations between the AP and TASS were in no way dependent upon relations between TASS and Reuters, and that in the event of any possible interruption of relations between TASS and Reuters, the relations of TASS-AP would not be impaired."83

This statement showed his growing concern about the AP-Reuters relationship and, in the case of a rupture, the AP's possibility of building up its independent foreign news coverage. The AP's main competitor in the domestic market was the UP. The AP now faced a very





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real danger of being replaced in the European news cartel by the UP. If the AP seceded from the cartel, what would happen to its agreement with TASS? The UP was more than eager to succeed the AP as TASS's contract partner.

The need to maintain the liaison with TASS was evident in letters addressed to J. G. Doletzky. Both Cooper and Bickel kept Doletzky informed of the situation (and especially of each other's operations) on the international news market either directly or through Durant. As a result, Doletzky was exceptionally well apprised of the two agencies' various maneuvers around the world. The crisis inside the cartel came as no surprise to him.

In 1932 TASS was again approached by the UP. Referring to TASS's refusal to sign a "blanket agreement" with Havas and Reuters, the UP suggested that TASS could make another forward step by refusing to renew its contracts unless the restrictions on TASS's relationships with other agencies were eliminated. According to Bickel:

If TASS declared that it would make co-operating news exchange agreements with any and all agencies with which it desired to have them, no agency in the world today would dare to take he position that it would refuse to handle the news of Soviet Russia in consequence.

Bickel also openly confessed the importance of TASS's relationship with the UP: "A refusal to co-operate on the part of Havas in France or the Balkans means nothing to the UP, for instance, because we immediately create our own organization."<sup>84</sup> Because of TASS's monopoly in the Soviet Union, the UP could not do the same there.

## THE END OF THE CARTEL

The AP's main concern was now in Japan, and it opened negotiations with the Rengo agency. Japan was of exceptional importance for the AP, because the UP had an agreement with the competing Japanese agency and the AP itself was restricted in operating there only under Reuters. Moreover, Rengo's agreement with Reuters was due shortly to expire. The crucial question was whether Rengo would conclude an agreement with the AP instead of Reuters, to whose territory it belonged. In the end, the American agency prevailed: in May 1933 Cooper signed a contract with Rengo. As a result, the Reuters' board gave the AP formal notice to renegotiate the 1932 four-party agreement.<sup>85</sup>

The UP knew exactly what Cooper was doing because it had earlier informed Reuters that if it came to a break between the AP and Reuters, the UP was prepared to pay for the Reuters' service inside the United States.<sup>86</sup> Bickel acted promptly and renewed his proposal for a non-exclusive arrangement between TASS and the UP which would include the AP. He reminded TASS that it had previously been hostile to world domination of news by certain nationalistic agencies. He further noted that, although TASS had a monopoly in its own country, it was not allowed to choose its partners abroad because of the cartel. Thus TASS was forced to discriminate against almost 500 newspapers in North America as well as a hundred papers in South America. Bickel concluded:

We believe that it would be to the advantage of TASS, as well as to the newspapers of the UP throughout the world, if the news of the Soviet Union collected by TASS was offered on equal terms to the newspapers of both the UP and the AP. [...] The old conception of a world-wide monopoly in news—distributed in a world largely divided between Havas and Reuter organizations and their affiliates—no longer prevails, as I well know you understand. The international news service picture, at present, is seemingly undergoing many changes. The suggestion presented in this letter for your consideration would, I believe, if it met your approval, be a very real forward step and one of distinct mutual advantage.<sup>87</sup>


As earlier, Bickel went to Moscow to negotiate his offer. He had several talks with Doletzky, the foreign ministry and Radek.

According to Bickel, Doletzky was ready to go the Politburo and ask for authority to reorganize TASS's existing contracts. He described his conversation with Doletzky:

After some hesitation he said this: If the U.S. government recognizes Russia that would give me the grounds to move on and I am certain that I could put this thing through. I mention this reluctantly and only because you are here in this room and I can talk in confidence. Otherwise in saying this I am afraid it would be misconstrued because I am not discussing recognition with you with any thought to ask you to urge recognition or drum it in any way. I am merely telling you this as a fact.88

Surprisingly, TASS still was not interested in changing its partner. Doletzky wrote to Durant that "there can be no question whatever of altering the agreement with the AP. After relations with the USA are renewed, the UP will be able to raise before the Soviet Government the question of terms in which they will work in the USSR. That would be quite natural, but there can be no question of TASS signing an agreement with two competing agencies simultaneously. An attempt to carry this through in other countries is hardly likely succeed."89

The hindrance to signing the agreements with both U.S. agencies disappeared, however, when the Soviet Union and the United States signed an agreement on November 17, 1933, to establish formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.<sup>90</sup> At this point, TASS was still reluctant to break its agreement with Havas and Reuters, but instead signed a treaty with them for one year.91 Now the AP approached TASS. Cooper confessed frankly that his attitude toward new proposals by Reuters would be largely affected by the position of TASS. He hoped that TASS was in a position to maintain an independent attitude and to refuse any direction from Reuters or Havas. Cooper further considered that the question of his future relations with TASS might be the determining factor in the question of the future relations of the AP with Reuters and Havas.92 Cooper said that the AP



School of Journalism, Indiana University Howard Archive, W. Roy

Source:

Howard Interviews Stalin

was determined from now on to make no contracts that hampered its future freedom of action in any sphere. Durant described his conversation with Cooper:

Cooper spoke with the greatest bitterness against Reuters. He denounced repeatedly the "overlordship" of Reuters and the attempt of Reuters to maintain a world hegemony over news. He said that the AP was determined from now on to maintain an independent position, and to make no contracts which hampered its freedom of action in any sphere. He called this the "TASS policy", and paid tribute to Doletzky and the TASS policy for having been the opening wedge in breaking the imperialistic rule of Reuters over world news. He said, "I am a pupil of Mr. Doletzky, and I am following his principles."<sup>93</sup>

The question of the U.S. agencies' relation to the cartel was still unsolved. Both the UP and the AP held negotiations with Reuters. It became a situation in which they had to decide whether they chose as their ally a British or a U.S. agency. Finally, Cooper suggested a "gentleman's agreement" to the UP in which they committed not to compete against each other in Europe by refraining from signing exclusive agreements. In practice this meant that both agencies would sign simultaneously with any European agency. After some hesitation the UP decided to sign the agreement on February 8, 1934.<sup>94</sup>

The prize that Cooper offered the UP for signing was to share the AP's agreement with TASS. Cooper knew very well how eager the UP was to obtain the contract with TASS.<sup>95</sup> After the UP had opted to sign the "the gentlemen's agreement,"<sup>96</sup> the AP achieved what it needed in the negotiations with Reuters. Cooper now knew that the UP would not sign an agreement with Reuters and replace the AP in the cartel. When Sir Roderick Jones of Reuters came to New York to negotiate, he offered to give the AP anything it wanted.<sup>97</sup> The preliminary contract they signed abolished the old principle of exclusive territories and made the participants free to sign with any agency they wished. It made the AP free to sell its world-wide service anywhere.<sup>98</sup>

## THE AP AND UP AGREEMENTS WITH TASS

Cooper went to Moscow in March 1934 to inform Doletzky of the new status of the AP-Reuters relations and the AP-UP agreement to refrain from exclusive contracts in Europe, and to discuss with him the future relations between the AP and TASS. Although Cooper travelled separately,<sup>99</sup> Bickel came to Moscow simultaneously.<sup>100</sup> Separately and together they held negotiations with the Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov and Doletzky. During their visit Doletzky promised to make a contract with the U.S. agencies and not to sign an exclusive agreement with either Havas or Reuters.<sup>101</sup>

When the AP and UP signed the permanent agreement which followed the principles of the temporary in May, Cooper told Jones that the AP had consented to a UP-TASS contract. Jones' only comment was that "all contracts with TASS were useless because the bolsheviks could not be depended on."<sup>102</sup> Obviously, Reuters never valued the agreement with TASS in the same way as did the U.S. agencies.

Doletzky kept his promise and made agreements with these agencies on a non-exclusive basis in the summer of 1934. The minutes of the negotiations show how reluctant both Havas and Reuters were to give up exclusive agreements with other agencies except the AP. As André Meynot of Havas said:

The agreement between the AP and Reuters is an exception. The principle of non-exclusivity is a harmful and dangerous principle. We cannot build a solid building by basing it on this bad principle. Let's protect the healthy principle of European contracts. To accept the American principle means the end of the alliance; it means anarchy and disorder. Bad principles cannot be allowed to contaminate us.<sup>103</sup>

Havas and Reuters would have agreed that the U.S. could be a nonexclusive territory for TASS. They had conceded an exception in regard to the Italian Stefani agency and the German DNB (which had agreements with the UP), but they had no intention of doing the same

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for other national agencies. However, Havas and Reuters finally agreed with Doletzky on the principle of non-exclusivity in their mutual relations and gave up a commission which was previously paid by TASS.<sup>104</sup> Hence, as a result of Doletzky's persistence, non-exclusivity was adopted in the agreement with national agencies as well.

When Doletzky visited the U.S. in the late fall, the AP, the UP and he signed agreements following the same principles.<sup>105</sup> The original intention was to include the International News Service, but later it had to be abandoned. The visit was considered a great success.<sup>106</sup>

## SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

After the recognition of the USSR by the U.S., the relationship between the two countries became formally normalized. When the AP and UP signed an agreement with TASS, they both achieved their goals and the relationship to TASS lost its special significance. Howard's interview with Stalin in 1936 came in the wake of the good relations between the agencies. As Doletzky wrote:

We may congratulate ourselves in the fact that he [Howard] was given an opportunity to be received by Stalin and to have a thorough interview with him. I am perfectly aware that this exceptional occurrence will still more strengthen all his press and the UP in their attitude of collaboration with our country<sup>107</sup>

From 1937 on, many things started to change. That year Bickel retired as president of the UP and was followed by Hugh Baillie.<sup>108</sup> Baillie was a different person and did not share Bickel's interest in the Soviet Union. Simultaneously the UP, which earlier was described as a liberal agency, became more established and conservative. Cooper, after having completed his international mission, became more interested in the domestic development of the AP. Both agencies faced a new situation in which radio stations entered their traditional news market.

The greatest changes transpired inside the Soviet Union. Stalin's

purges, with the "Great Terror," reached their acme in 1937.<sup>109</sup> The show trial of The Seventeen in January 1937 ("the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center") described a purported center for the organization of terrorism, diversion and espionage seeking to undermine the USSR and hasten its defeat in the war. One of the accused was Karl Radek, a member of the TASS Board of Directors. Vladimir Romm, a former member of the TASS staff and *Izvestiia's* correspondent in New York, was accused of conspiring against the Soviet regime and serving as an intermediary between Trotsky and Radek. Radek was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and and Romm to the interior.<sup>110</sup>

Given that both Radek and Romm had close contacts with TASS, it was inevitable that people working in the agency would also be a target. Several people were replaced inside TASS in early 1937.<sup>111</sup> The TASS chief, Doletzky, was in danger for several reasons. First, he had been a friend of Radek. Second, people with foreign contacts such as journalists or diplomats were considered especially suspicious. Third, Doletzky was Polish, and they suffered the highest casualties among foreigners in Russia.<sup>112</sup> It is not clear what accusations would have been levelled against Doletzky, because he shot himself in his office on the eve of his arrest. A number of his assistants and confidants were arrested.<sup>113</sup> The man who invented the TASS principle of equal relations between the agencies paid with his life for his foreign contacts.

## CONCLUSIONS

The early history of the U.S.-Russian news agency relations is full of contradictions.

The world's first so-called "revolutionary" agency (ROSTA/TASS) signed an agreement with the old European news agency cartel to achieve diplomatic recognition. Further, it preferred the "reactionary" AP to the "progressive" UP as its partner. For its part, the "reactionary" AP considered the "revolutionary" TASS as an ideal model and ally in the struggle against the news cartel in which it itself was a full member. Meanwhile, the "independent" UP—which publicly

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FIGURE 6 G. Doletzky Terhi Rantanen



Jakob G. Doletzky, General Manager of ROSTA/TASS, 1921 - 1937 Source: Private collection of Professor S. J. Doletzky, son of J. G. Doletzky

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resented government-owned agencies and their privileges—was the state-owned TASS's first ally and maintained good connections with it even after their agreement collapsed. Finally, when the two U.S. agencies decided to sign a non-exclusive contract, the AP had to allow the UP to share in its agreement with TASS.

The development of relations between these three agencies also suggests that the significance of ownership forms should not be exaggerated. Despite the fact that the agencies had different ownership forms (cooperative, private and state), they found it expedient to seek state assistance (especially foreign ministries) before establishing foreign contacts. It is no coincidence that news agency relations corresponded closely to diplomatic recognition—first in the case of ROSTA's agreement with the news cartel in 1924, then in the case of the AP and UP in 1934.

The cartel was crushed by the U.S. agencies acting in concert with a Japanese and a Soviet agency. It is difficult, of course, to say which agency had the most important role. Nevertheless, in contrast to conventional assumptions about the AP's role, it is clear that the campaign was really a joint venture of several national agencies. These agencies operated together instead of acting separately, and it was their cooperation that produced the final result.

It was not enough that the AP signed a non-exclusive agreement with Reuters. The AP had to ensure that no other agency would sign with Reuters and assume its role. The UP was the first news service that operated from the outset as an independent agency and nonetheless rose to become an international agency. The AP quickly adopted the UP's strategy and started to seek allies among other national agencies.

Both the U.S. agencies had two foreign markets that were especially important to them. One was Japan, where the UP had entered first and achieved a strong foothold. It was essential for the AP to operate independently of Reuters and to gain direct access as the UP had done. The second was the Soviet Union, where the UP was also the first, but subsequently lost its contact and right to operate. The AP, on the other

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hand, prevailed there because of the cartel and could keep out its American rival. If TASS had remained with the cartel and thus severed its relations with both the AP and UP, it would have been disastrous for the U.S. agencies. By agreeing to sign contracts with both U.S. agencies and a non-exclusive contract with Reuters, TASS guaranteed the fall of the news cartel.

Finally, it became a quesion of an alliance either between a British or one U.S. agency, or between two U.S. agencies. The decision to choose the latter was essential for the future of the U.S. agencies. By having a common policy against the cartel members and by supporting each other, the U.S. agencies ensured that both could become international agencies. Hence, the United States became the only country in the world to have two international news agencies and thus a dominant position in the world news market. This development took place simultaneously with the U.S. expansion in cable communications, radio and motion pictures.<sup>114</sup>

It has been said that if World War II had not broken out, the U.S. agencies would have become international by the late 1930s.<sup>115</sup> By 1934 both the AP and the UP had complete freedom of action all over the world. However, the war deferred this expansion until the post-war period. The development of TASS's foreign connections, on the other hand, were first interrupted by the purges, which eliminated key executives with foreign connections, and secondly by World War II. TASS systematically started to develop its foreign connections in the early 1960s, although there is practically no research done on that period.<sup>116</sup> TASS's position as an international agency was different from its Western counterparts. By the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was the only international agency operating in communist countries.

The history of relations between the U.S. agencies and TASS has been an object of scant scholarly research. Soviet researchers have completely ignored the role of Doletzky in changing ROSTA into a modern news agency and establishing its foreign relations. Despite Kruglak's and Iwanaga's books, no attention has been given to the role of other national agencies, except the AP and Rengo, in breaking up the international news cartel.<sup>117</sup> There is considerable evidence that Bickel was close to the truth when he later wrote:

It will surprise a lot of people to know, however, that the folks that really gave the final blow that killed the old Official Gang of propaganda in 1933 [1934] was TASS and the Soviteers ... and that killing was done in Moscow .. vide Cooper and myself in attendance as witness.<sup>118</sup>

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## NOTES

1. Copies of the interview can be found in Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), fond 4459, opis' 11, delo 794, listy 71-82 and in the Roy W. Howard (RHW) archive at Indiana University (IU). The RWH archive also contains Howard's 11-page-letter in which he describes his interview with Stalin. Originally, Howard had wired Stalin for a talk from Paris. Since Stalin had given only a few interviews to American newspapermen, the response to Howard's wire was "just another demonstration of the old time UP theory that you can never tell until you try." During his visit Howard met the leading officials of TASS and the Foreign Ministry. The interview took place in the Kremlin on March 1 and took three and half hours. Howard described Stalin: "To my surprise I noted that he is no taller than I am [Howard himself was described as "a small package"], though he probably weighs 165 to 170 pounds. He has rather medium sized, soft hands, with nails clipped down close, but no evidence of a manicure. He has a high forehead, somewhat dreamy brown eyes that have a tendency to twinkle as an evidence of an easy working and readily accessible sense of humor." Roy W. Howard to W. W. Hawkins on March 3, 1936 IU/RWH archive. The interview was released by an agreement with the Russian government on March 4, 1936 and 6,000 newspapers received the story. "6,000 Papers Receive Howard's Interview," Editor and Publisher, March 7, 1936, p. 1.

2. Hugh Baillie (the president of the UP in 1935-1955) claimed that the interview "probably got more prominence than any interview ever granted by the head of a government in my recollection at least, because there is hardly an newspaper in the US which failed to print it." H. Baillie to J. G. Doletzky on March 9, 1936. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 831, l. 5. Pravda wrote that "Comrade Stalin's answers represent a most important political document, which has a great principalized and realistic significance. This is a historical conversation. Only a leader of a great country, assured of its power, could speak with such clarity, calm and strength, as it was done by Comrade Stalin. The conversation between Stalin and Roy Howard will resound broadly in the world. It will resound in the hearts of tens of millions and will be the object of thought everywhere, where there are people, who are honestly fighting for peace and who honestly try to find an answer to questions, which have been placed by history." "Priamoi i iasnoi otvet," Pravda (5 marta 1936 g.), p. 1; "Polnaia iasnost' dlia druzei" and "Beseda tovarishsa Stalina s predsedatel'em amerikanskogo ob'edineniia "Skripps Govard N'iospeipers" s gospodinom Roi Govardom 1-go marta 1936 g.," Izvestiia (5 marta 1936 g.), pp. 1, 2. The interview was suppressed in Germany and Poland.

3. The previous interview was given to G. H. Wells in 1934. The UP bureau chief in Moscow, Eugene Lyons, interviewed Stalin in 1930. One interview was granted in 1926 when Stalin received four representatives of the Japanese newspaper, Osaka Mainichi. Walter Duranty of **The New York Times** had interviewed Stalin twice. "Stalin Interview Won After Year's Work," **Editor & Publisher, The Fourth Estate**, November 29, 1930; Roy W. Howard to W. W. Hawkins on March 3, 1936. IU/RWH archive; "Story of a Beat," **The Literary Digest**, March 14, 1936.

4. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on March 20, 1936. GARF f. 4459, p. 11, d. 794, l. 115.

5. Doletzky is originally a Polish name and should be translitterated correctly Dolecki. Since the form Doletzky has been used in the previous literature and he himself signed the contracts using that form, it is also adopted here.

6. G. A. Shiskin, "Iz okna N'iu-iorkskogo neboskreba," TASS soobshsaet (Moskva: Politizdat, 1988), p. 270.

7. This material is apparently partly equivalent to the material Theodore Kruglak received from the New York TASS office. Theodore Kruglak, **The Two Faces of TASS** (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. i.

8. On the history of the cartel, see Gunilla Ingmar, Monopol på nyheter. Ekonomiska och politiska aspekter på svenska och internationella nyhetsbyråers verksamhet 1870-1917. Studia historica Upsaliensia LII (Uppsala: Esselte Studium, 1973) and Terhi Rantanen, Foreign News in Imperial Russia. The Relationship between International and Russian News Agencies, 1856-1914. Annales Academiae Scientarum Fennicae. Dissertationes Humanum Litteratum No 58 (Helsinki: Gummerus, 1990).

9. Pierre Frédérix, Un siècle de chasse aux nouvelles. De l'Agence d'Information Havas à l'Agence France-Presse 1853-1937 (Paris: Flammarion, 1959), pp. 316-317.

10. N. A. Bryliakov, "Rossiiskoe telegrafnoe agentstvo i ego rol' v stanovlenii i razvitii partiino-sovetskoi pechati (1918-1923 gg.)". Kandidatskaia dissertatsiia. Fakul'tet zhurnalistiki, Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1973, pp. 22-23; B. Metlitskii, "PTA soobshsaet," **Tassovets** No 20 (10 sentiabria 1969 g.), No 21 (17 sentiabria 1969 g.), No 22 (24 sentiabria 1969 g.).

 Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State. Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 38, 44;
A. Z. Okorokov, Oktiabr' i krakh russkoi burzhuaznoi pressy (Moskva: Mysl', 1970); Bryliakov, "Rossiiskoe telegrafnoe agentstvo," pp. 22-28. 38

#### 12. The decree is published in TASS soobshsaet, p. 65.

13. "Postanovlenie presidiuma VTsIK o Rossiiskom telegrafnom agentstve (ROSTA) ot 7 sentiabria 1918 g.," **O partiinoi i sovetskoi pechati, radioveshsanii i televidenii** (Moskva: Mysl', 1972), pp. 62-63; O. E. Solov'ev, "Predshestvennik TASS," **Voprosy istorii**, 1972, No 12, pp. 195-199; "Rossiiskoe telegrafnoe agentst-vo," pp. 18-19; N. A. Bryliakov, "K voprosu o roli V. I. Lenina v sozdanii i stanovlenii gosudarstvennoi informatsionnoi sistemi v SSSR," **Voprosy istorii**, 1980, No 8, pp. 80-90.

14. Before the revolution Leonid Stark (1889-1937) served in the Baltic navy in Helsinki and edited the newspaper, Volna. A.F. Berezhnoi and S.V. Smirnov, Boitsy revoliutsii. Sotrudniki bol'shevistskoi pechati. Bibliograficheskii sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1969), pp. 224-245; Geroi oktiabria, vol. 2 (Moskva: Lenizdat, 1967), p. 434.

15. P. M. Kerzhentsev (1881-1940), originally Lebedev, was a former correspondent of Pravda who was forced to emigrate abroad in 1912 for six years. After his return to Russia he worked as acting chief editor for **Izvestiia**. Kerzhentsev served ROSTA until the end of 1920 when he became a diplomat. **Bolshaia sovetskaia** entsiklopedia No<sup>-12</sup> (Moskva: Sovetskaia entsiklopedia, 1973), pp. 163-164; Z. Simonova, "P. M. Kerzhentsev—Otvestvennyi rukovoditel' ROSTA (mai 1919 g.-1920 g.)," Sovetskaia zhurnalistika. Istoriia, traditsii, opyt (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1979), pp. 101-110; N. A. Bryliakov, "Lenin i ROSTA," Tassovets No 15 (16 sentiabria 1980 g.), p. 3; N. A. Bryliakov, "Revolutsioner, publitsist, diplomat, gosudartsvennyi deiatel', uchenyi. K 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia P. M. Kerzhentseva," Tassovets No 19 (12 avgusta 1981 g.), pp. 163-164.

16. Bolsheviks actively used radio in transmitting government decrees. Lenin ordered the PTA to investigate the possibility of using radio in January 1918. Thus ROSTA used radio from its beginning. V. N. Ruzhnikov, "Radio v partiinoi i gosudarstvennoi deiatel'nosti V. I. Lenina," Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Ser. Zhurnalistika, 1980, No 2, pp. 12-14.

#### 17. Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State, pp. 115-118.

18. Bryliakov, p. 8; P. M. Kerzhentsev, Gazeta (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1925), pp. 129-135; O. E. Solov'ev, "Predshestvennik TASS," Voprosy istorii, 1972, No 12, pp. 195-197.

19. Jacob G. Doletzky (1888-1937), originally Feigin, was a son of a landowner in eastern Poland, became a revolutionary and was exiled to Siberia. Later, he edited the

Polish Bolshevik newspaper, **Tribune**, in 1917. **Bolshaia Sovetskaia Ensiklopediia** No 33 (Moskva: Sovetskaia ensiklopediia, 1931), pp. 58-59. Eugene Lyons in his book, **Assignment in Utopia** (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937), pp. 44, 75, described Doletzky as "a Stalinist machine politician" (p. 44). Later in 1959, Lyons said: "Looking back, Doletzky deserved better treatment than I gave him. [...] He was of the old type of revolutionaries—the intellectual Jews who were editing newspapers—literate, well-educated." Kruglak, **The Two Faces of TASS**, pp. 22-31. According to information provided by Doletzky's son, Prof. S. J. Doletzky, his father was a Polish German. Interview with S. J. Doletzky on July 30, 1993.

#### 20. Kruglak, The Two Faces of TASS, pp. 24-25.

21. Solov'ev, "Predshestvennik TASS," p. 197; N. A. Bryliakov, "Lenin i Rosta," p. 3.

22. Kenneth Durant (1899-1972) was born of a well-to-do family in Philadelphia. His father helped to build the Moscow-St. Petersburg railroad. Durant was graduated from Harvard College in 1921 and worked briefly for The Philadelphia Bulletin. In World War I he was active in the Creel Comission. Later, through a friendship with the diplomat William C. Bullit (see footnote 47), he became an aide to Col. Edward M. House, President Woodrow Wilson's adviser, and attended the Versailles Peace Conference. With John Reed (see footnote 47), his college friend, and Walter Lippmann, another Harvard associate, Durant was caught up in the excitement of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. And when he returned to the U.S., he became a secretary to Ludwig C.A.K. Martens, the unrecognized Soviet envoy in the U.S. Subsequently he was publisher of **Soviet Russia**, the official weekly magazine of information about the Soviet Union. Durant was the first correspondent in the U.S. for TASS and the manager of its New York office during the years 1923-1944. The New York Times, December 1, 1972, p. 42. He was unfamiliar with the Russian language. Durant's position as a middle-man between TASS and its U.S. clients was not always easy. When he was asked by TASS to comment on the quality of its material, he wrote that there was "a slight tendency to use too much superlatives to claim too many "enormous" successes. [...] However, achievements are so large and so many that they need not to be emphasized by superlatives and exaggerated language. The facts and figures speak for themselves, and it is better to let the facts and figures speak for themselves. [...] For example, I fear that the bourgeois editor might be inclined to reject a mailer such as that of January on Culture and Everyday Life which begins, "The victory of Socialism has led to the improvement of the health of the toiling masses." The mailer contains most interesting and significant information regarding the improvement of the health of the masses. It would have been better to give this information and let the readers conclude for themselves therefore the victory of Socialism." K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on February 4, 1936. GARF f. 4459, d. 11, op. 794, 11. 4-9.

Kruglak, **The Two Faces of TASS**, pp. 91-91. For more about Durant, see Eugene Lyons, **Assignment in Utopia**, pp. 40-41, 44-45, and about TASS's New York Office, Harry Freeman, "Tass peredaet iz N'iu-Iorka," **Zhurnalist** No 7, 1973, p. 58.

23. The correspondents were located in Helsinki, Stockholm, Revel, Riga, Kovno, Warsaw, Rome, Athens, Prague, Peking, Tokyo, Kabul, Urga, Tehran, Angora, Constantinople, Mexico, Harbin and Alexandria. L. Madiar, "Inostrannaia informatsiia. Oktiabr' 1923-sentiabr' 1924," **Biulleten' Tsentrorosty** No 3 (25 oktiabria 1924 g.), p. 2; Lapitskii, "Shtrikhi rasnykh let," pp. 91-94.

24. G. V. Chicherin (1872-1936) was a revolutionary and diplomat who was born in the prominent noble family with diplomacy as a family profession. After his graduation in 1895 from the Moscow University he joined the archival section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he resigned in 1904 and travelled abroad. In 1918 he returned to Russia and became Trotsky's assistant as deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs and later the same year replaced Trotsky. Chicherin resigned in 1927 after criticism by Rykov, Bukharin and Stalin. Teddy J. Uldrics, "Chicherin Georgii Vasil'evich," in Joseph L. Wieczynski (ed.), **The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History**, Vol. 7 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1978), pp. 42-47.

25. Karl Radek (1885-1939), originally Sobelsohn, was a Polish Jewish revolutionary and newspaperman who lived mostly in Germany and Austria. After the October revolution, Radek was appointed to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, headed by Leon Trotsky. He became the head of the Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda that was intended to solidify the revolution in Russia by spreading its principles in neighboring countries. Many foreigners, including John Reed, joined it. In December 1918, Radek crossed the German frontier illegally, took part in the uprising and was arrested. He was released and returned to Russia in January, 1920. He was elected to the Bolshevik Central Committee and appointed secretary of Comintern. Radek was the chief foreign affairs commentator in the Soviet press, regarded as the best communist journalist in the world. Robert D. Warth, "Radek, Karl," in Joseph L. Wieczynski (ed.) The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, Vol. 30 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1982), pp. 139-143; Jeanne Vronskaya (ed.), A Biographical Dictionary of the Soviet Union 1917-1988 (London: K. G. Saur, 1989), p. 343; Louise Bryant, Six Red Months in Russia. An Observer's Account of Russia Before and During the Proletarian Dictatorship (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918), p. 201; David C. Duke, John Reed (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987), p. 34; Warren Lerner, Karl Radek. The Last Internationalist (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970). Bickel claimed that Doletzky was selected as director of ROSTA because of his friendship with Radek, a fellow Pole. Kruglak, The Two Faces of TASS, pp. 23-24.

26. Z. A. Nurmanova, "Vozniklovenie i razvitie informatsionnoi sluzhby respublik Srednei Azii (1917-1924 gg.)". Kandidatskaia dissertatsiia. Fakul'tet zhurnalistiki, Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet 1975, pp. 153-154; V. Vilenskii (Sibiriakov),

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"Nam nuzhen sovetskii 'Asoshieited Press'," **Izvestiia** (9 ianvaria 1924 g.), p. 2; Kollektiv rabotnikov "Gudka" (sledyet 12 podpisei), "Gazety dlia 'Rosta', ili 'Rosta' dlia gazet?" **Izvestiia** (12 ianvaria 1924 g.), p. 2; V. Vilenskii, "Gazety dlia Rosta ili Rosta dlia gazet? Pochemu nam nuzhno reorganizovat' Rosta," Iur. Ianopol'skii, "Nam ne nuzhen sovetskii 'Asoshieited Press'," M. Levidov, "Nam ne nuzhno nichemnogo prozkhekterstva," **Izvestiia** (16 ianvaria 1924 g.), p. 3.

27. "Polozhenie o Telegrafnom Agentstve Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (TASS) (10 iiulia 1925 g.)," O partiinoi i sovetskoi pechati, radioveshsanii i televidenii, pp. 134-136; Nikolai Pal'gunov, Osnovy informatsii v gazete. Tass i ego rol' (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1955), pp. 27-28.

28. Terhi Rantanen, "The Associated Press and the International News Cartel, 1861-1918" (Paper presented at the ICA Conference in Washington, May 27-31, 1993).

29. See Terhi Rantanen, "Mr. Howard Goes to South America. The United Press Associations and Foreign Expansion," Roy W. Howard Monographs in Journalism and Mass Communication Research, No 2 (May 5, 1992).

30. The agreement was signed on August 26, 1927 in Geneva. 1/8714756. Reuters' (R) archive.

31. "World Wire Service Men Meet at Geneva," "Will Seek Laws to Guard News Property," Editor and Publisher, August 21, p. 5 and September 4, p. 9, 1926; "Geneva Press Parley Attracts 60 Delegates," "Government News the Property of All, Opinion of League Press Delegates," "Geneva Conference Denounces Censorship," Editor and Publisher, August 13, p. 7, August 27, p. 1, and September 3, p. 5, 1927.

32. Rantanen, "Mr. Howard Goes to South America," pp. 22-23.

33. Kent Cooper (1880-1965) was born in Columbus, Indiana, and studied at Indiana University, which he left in 1899 to become a reporter on **The Indianapolis Press** and later **Indianapolis News**. In 1903, he started working for the Scripps-McRae Press Association in Indiana. Cooper entered the AP in December, 1910, became the chief of traffic in 1913 and general manager in 1925. "Kent Cooper Appointed A.P. General Manager," **Editor & Publisher**, April 25, 1925, p. 18; Kent Cooper, **Kent Cooper and the AP** (New York: Random House, 1955); Richard A. Schwarzlose, "Kent Cooper," in Joseph McKerns (ed.) **Biographical Dictionary of** 

American Journalism (Westpoint: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 129-131; The New York Times, January 31, 1965, p. 82.

34. Roy W. Howard (1883-1964) was born in Gano, Ohio. He worked for several newspapers in Indianapolis and St. Louis. He joined the Scripps organization in 1905 as assistant managing editor of **The Cincinnati Post**. In 1907 he was appointed the UP's first general news manager. In 1912 he became President and General Manager of the same association, and in 1925 joined Robert P. Scripps as Editorial Director of the Scripps-Howard chain. Biographical story on R. W. Howard. The RWH-Archive; "Roy W. Howard Leaves the United Press," **Editor and Publisher**, July 31, 1920, p. 15; David Weaver, "Howard, Roy Wilson," **American National Biography** (in press).

35. W. W. Hawkins (1883-1953) was born in Springfield, Missouri. After his graduation from high school he went to work on **The Springfield Republican** and then other newspapers. In 1906 he joined the Publishers' Press (the predecessor of the UP). Later he became vice-president and general manager of the UP. He was UP's president in 1920-1923. He resigned to become executive manager of the business department of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers. "Bill Hawkins of the U.P.—Some Call Him Mister," **Editor and Publisher**, November 27, 1920, p. 1; "Hawkins Goes with Scripps-Howard Newspapers.—Bickel Heads UP," **Editor & Publisher**, January 6, 1923, p. 9; **The New York Times**, February 20, 1953, p. 19.

36. Karl A. Bickel (1882-1972) was born in Geneseo, Illinois, but moved later to California, where he attended Stanford University, worked for **The San Francisco News**, and joined the United Press as its first manager at Portland, Oregon, in 1907. Bickel bought an interest in **The Grand Junction News** and for four years was editor and publisher of that newspaper. He returned to the UP as a travelling representative in the business department, became business manager, then news manager and president (1923-1935). Morris, **Deadline Every Minute**, pp. 52-53; "The United Press," **Fortune**, May 1933, p. 59; **The New York Times** on December 12, 1972, p. 52. Curiously, **Biographical Dictionary of American Journalism** does not mention his name.

37. Bickel attempted in 1922 to secure a visa to Moscow with the idea of making new arrangements for exchange of news, but did not receive it. He went to Russia in mid-July of 1923, planning to stay for ten days, but instead remained until September. He spent much of his time making Doletzky familiar with American news agency ideas, explaining how telephone circuits could be set up for transmission of daily reports to several newspapers simultaneously, drawing designs for copy desks and other newsroom equipment, and helping to order new teleprinter machines. Morris, **Deadline Every Minute**, pp. 136-137. After his first visit Bickel returned to Russia in

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1925, 1927, 1929, 1933, 1934, and 1935. Before American recognition of the Soviet governments, U.S. passports were not valid for travel in Russia, and Bickel travelled on his own recognizance. Hugh Baillie, **High Tension. The Recollections of Hugh Baillie** (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1959), p. 106.

38. Translation of letter, dated the 15th May [1917], from the Havas Agency, Paris, to the Managing Director, Reuters Limited, London. R/Ex Briggs papers.

39. An unsigned, undated memorandum. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA) f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1042, l. 127; Roy W. Howard to Mr. Stanley Washburn on February 18, 1916. IU/RWH archive.

40. W. S. Shepard to A. Loviagin on April 29, 1917. RGIA f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1042, 1. 3, f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1010, l. 123. A. Loviagin to R. W. Howard on May 20, 1917. RGIA f. 1358, op 1, d. 1010, l. 134. Memoriia o zaiavleniiakh soedinennoi pressy Ameriki sdelannykh po povodu trebovanii predstavitel'ei eia periodicheskoi pechati byt' dopushsennymi k pol'sovaniiu uslugami osvedomitel'noi sluzhby PTA. RGIA f. 1358, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 50-51; The PTA sent its representative, A. J. Sack to negotiate with Roy W. Howard and E. W. Scripps. R. W. Howard to E. W. Scripps on June 1, 1917. Roy W. Howard collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (LC). A. J Sack to the PTA on July 14, 1917. RGIA f. 1358, op. 1, d. 1010, ll. 55-59. Reuters' managing director to Melville E. Stone on August 3, 1917. R/Ex Briggs c/box 17/18.

41. As a result, Reuters' correspondent withdrew to Finland. He soon returned to report from Moscow, but was arrested in July 1918. Donald Read, **The Power of News. The History of Reuters 1849-1989** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 144-145. Because of that, Reuters' attitude towards ROSTA became hostile. "Havas, with whom we moved in these matters hand in hand, had always objected to an arrangement with the ROSTA Agency and that for good reasons we entirely shared." Reuters Minute Book on August 8, 1923. R/1/883512. K. Bickel to J. G. Doletzky on May 12, 1933. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 623, ll. 1-7. Reuters' Minute Book on December 12, 1917. R/1/883511.

42. As R. W. Howard wrote in 1918: "Russia, which should ultimately hold something out for us, is impossible now. [...] I had a long talk with Creel this week. He is willing to go the limit with us. He would have done anything I wanted him to do in Russia, in fact was very anxious to have me go there several months ago and before the Bolsheviki thing became acute. I did not want to go because I did not believe the thing has touched bottom and I don't think it has yet." R. W. Howard to H. B. Clark on January 26, 1918, IU/RWH archive. George Creel (1876-1953) was chairman of the Committee of Public Information that spread American propaganda abroad during World War I. See George Creel, **How We Advertised America. The First Telling of**  the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920).

43. Frank J. Taylor (1894-1972) contributed to several newspapers including The Stanford University Daily, Los Angeles Examiner and San Francisco Examiner before becoming a U.P. war correspondent covering revolutions in Germany and Central Empires. In 1917 Taylor entered Russia in a box-car loaded with Russian prisoners returning to Moscow from Germany. He was informed that he was under "house arrest" at the old Metropole Hotel. "One morning about 3 A.M. there was a heavy knock on Taylor's door and a Red Army soldier motioned him to get dressed. The soldier then led him away so solemly that Taylor was pretty sure that they had decided to solve his problems by shooting him without further ceremony. They went down an underground stairway, and Taylor was unceremoniously propelled into a dimly lighted room. Inside there was an old man with a shawl around his shoulders. He had a feather duster and was busy dusting off a large, cluttered desk. He greeted Taylor in English and went on dusting so industriously that the reporter hesitated to ask him if he expected to be shot, too. At last, however, he worked conversation around to the subject of the undergorund office and asked why his companion was there. "Why, I'm the Foreign Minister, replied Grigori Chicherin, "and this is my office. I understood you wanted to interview me." A week later, Taylor was eventually deported to Finland. Morris, Deadline Every Minute, pp. 112-113. Later, Taylor wrote hundreds of nonfiction articles for national magazines and was the author of nine books. Who's Who Among North American Authors 1936-39 (Los Angeles: Golden Syndicate Publishers Company, 1937), p. 935; The New York Times, October 24, 1972, p. 46.

44. Morris, **Deadline Every Minute**, pp. 112-114; Kruglak, **The Two Faces of TASS**, pp. 62-64; "Government News Control Widening," **Editor & Publisher**, April 21, 1934, p. 6.

45. Kruglak, The Two Faces of TASS, p. 64.

46. Karl Bickel to Under-Secretary Frank Polk on January 28, 1920; The vice president of the UP to DeWitt C. Poole (Division of Russian Affairs at the State Department) on March 10, 1920. Department of State, National Archives (NA).

47. Louise Bryant (1887-1936) was introduced as the widow of John Reed by the INS, but she was a professional journalist in her own right. Together with Reed she went to Russia in September 1917 to cover the events in Petrograd. Bryant held credentials from the Bell Syndicate and **Metropolitan Magazine**. She wrote a book about the October revolution and interviewed Kerensky (and made critical remarks on Lenin) and the leading female politicians such as Alexandra Kollontai. See Bryant,

Six Red Months in Russia. Unfortunately, her book has been totally overshadowed by Reed's Ten Days That Shook the World (New York: Modern Library, 1960). Different biographies concentrate on Bryant's love affairs instead of her professional career. After Reed's death she married the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, William Bullit, in 1923 (see footnote 22). This marriage ended in divorce in 1930. William Bassow, The Moscow Correspondents. Reporting on Russia from the Revolution to Glasnost (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1988), pp. 25-30; Barbara Gelb, So Short a Time. A Biography of John Reed and Louise Bryant (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), pp. 288-289. On Bryant's work as a correspondent in Russia, see Julia Edwards, Women of the World: The Great Foreign Correspondents (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), pp. 32-39.

48. An unsigned letter of the INS to Comrade Tchitcherine [Chicherin] on May 31, 1922. GARF f. 391, op. 1, d. 1639, ll. 4, 6-9.

49. John (Johan?) Graudenz (1882-1942), who had previously worked for the old socialist newspaper **Milwaukee Leader**, became UP representative in Berlin and after the UP agreement with ROSTA its first correspondent to Moscow. In 1924 he vanished, reappearing later in Germany. The Nazi government accused Graudenz of Soviet espionage in the Schilze-Boysen-Harnack espionage trial that took place in Berlin in 1942. He was described as an "old German Communist party militant who had served as the UP correspondent in Berlin and Moscow." At the time of the trial, Graudenz was 60 years old, and was charged with obtaining data on the German output of aircraft through his connections with the engineers of the Air Ministry with whom he had business dealings as a salesman of automatic brakes. Together with other members of the anti-Nazi ring, he was executed on December 22, 1942. Kruglak, **The Two Faces of TASS**, pp. 65-67.

50. The agreement was signed in Moscow on December 25, 1922, GARF f. 391, op. 1, d. 102, ll. 30-31; Kruglak, **The Two Faces of TASS**, pp. 227-230. It was renewed in 1923 (signed by Bickel and Doletzky).

51. ROSTA's first foreign agreement with Telegraphen Union was signed on August 11, 1922. GARF f. 391, 1. 1639, 20. The contract with Wolff was made on September 30, 1922, in Berlin. GARF f. 391, 1, 1639, 121-123.

52. Rantanen, "Mr. Howard Goes to South America," p. 9.

53. John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States. An interpretive history (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978), p. 98.

54. J. G. Doletzky to K. Durant on October 10, 1924. GARF f. 391, op. 1, d. 62, ll. 77-78.

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55. "The principal Russian Agency was the ROSTA Agency, an undisguised Soviet Propaganda Agency, with which Reuters and Havas had hitherto refused to have anything to do." Reuters' minute book on April 10, 1923. R/1/883512.

56. A. Meynot to Jean L. Adamski on November 9 and 30, 1923. 5AR 416, 1, 2-3. Archives Nationales (AN). Frédérix, **Un siècle de chasse aux nouvelles**, pp. 33-345.

57. J. G. Doletzky to K. Durant on October 10, 1924. GARF f. 391, op. 1, d. 62, ll. 77-78.

58. K. Bickel to R. W. Howard on September 15, 1924. LC/RWH collection; Morris, **Deadline Every Minute**, p. 176.

59. K. Bickel to R. W. Howard on September 3, 1924. LC/RWH collection.

60. Madiar, "Inostrannaia informatsiia," p. 1.

61. Y. Iwanaga to K. Cooper on May 26, 1928. The Kent Cooper (KC) papers. Lilly Library, Indiana University (IU).

62. Report for Sir Roderick Jones of negotiations between Reuters, Havas, and Rosta, held at Paris on March 27 and 28, 1924. RJ BF3. Reuters' Minute Book on April 24, 1923, and April 8, 1924. R/1/883512. The agreement was signed in Paris on March 28, 1924. AN/5AR 416, 1, 7. R/1/883512; GARF f. 391, op. 1, d. 1639, ll. 156-162. It was renewed in 1926 when ROSTA was changed into TASS (R/1/8714885, AN/5AR 416, 1, 17), in 1930 (R 1/8712423, AN/5AR 416, 1, 29) and in 1933 (R 1/8712405, AN/5AR 416, 1, 45).

63. Mongolia was also considered ROSTA's home territory. ROSTA was supposed to pay to both Reuters and Havas 1000 livres annually. The agreement could be renewed year after year. It was signed in Paris on March 28, 1924 by Clements of Reuters, Meynot of Havas and Doletzky of ROSTA. R 1/8715604. As Clements wrote later: "[...] as regards ROSTA is quite different from that of any other European agency. Owing to the special conditions we were unable to undertake the same guarantees for the exchange of news between ROSTA and all other countries of the world. Hence the necessity for ROSTA to make direct agreements, but as said before, this does not apply to any other country [...] Note for Sir Roderick Jones from S. Carey Clements on November 5, 1925. R/Microfilm 177.

64. Frédérix, Un siècle de chasse aux nouvelles, pp. 345-346.

65. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on January 25, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 651,

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11. 1-6.

66. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on August 18 and 24, 1933. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 622, ll. 117-118, 122-123.

67. J. G. Doletzky to K. Durant on May 27, 1925. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 32, ll. 45-47.

68. Morris, Deadline Every Minute, pp. 175-176.

69. The agreement was signed in August 1927 in Geneva. R 1/864921.

70. E. Keen to K. Bickel on May 28, 1927 (confidential). LC/ RWH collection.

71. The Polish foreign minister Zaleski gave a speech in Warsaw in which he said that "news agencies which you direct are charged with the task of communicating to the public intentions of your governments. You are therefore to a certain extent organs which supplement ministries of foreign affairs which without your efficacious aid would be deaf instruments, devoid of resonance and echo." E. Keen to K. Bickel on May 28, 1927. LC/RWH collection.

72. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on June 4, 1929. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 360, ll. 358-359.

73. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on July 26, 1927. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 176, l. 74.

74. The UP Correspondent to J. G. Doletzky on May 6, 1927. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 240, 1. 20.

75. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on April 28, 1927. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 175, ll. 36-41.

76. K. Durant's memorandum on the AP's relation with the USSR on June 8, 1926. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 108, ll. 9-11.

77. J. G. Doletzky to K. Durant on November 27, 1927. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 176, l. 110.

78. The documents available do not reveal Cooper's personal impressions about his trip to Moscow, but according to his conversation with Durant, he took the greatest satisfaction in the discovery that he could drink 16 glasses of vodka without feel-

ing more than a slight weakness in the knees. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on July 26, 1927. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 176, l. 74.

79. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on March 23, 1927. GARF f. op. 4459, d. 11, l. 173.

80. K, Durant to J. G. Doletzky on August 21, 1929, and on September 12, 1933. GARF f. 4459, d. 11, op. 361, l. 48; f. 4459, d. 11, op. 598, l. 1.

81. The Jewish Telegraph Agency was established in 1919. It had offices in New York, London, Paris, Berlin, Warsaw and Jerusalem, along with 146 correspondents supplying the more important Jewish newspapers throughout the world. Victor Rosewater, **History of Cooperative News Gathering in the United States** (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1930), pp. 368-369. The agency's foreign correspondents became the victims of Hitler in many countries. The State Department could not help in saving them, because most did not have U.S. citizenship. NA/Department of State.

82. Lyons, Covering Moscow. Russian year-end review on 31 December, 1929. LC/RWH collection. Eugene Lyons (1898-1985) was UP correspondent in Moscow from 1928 until 1934, when he was expelled. After Lyons left the UP he spent the rest of his working life as a prominent and articulate anti-Communist. He published eleven books and was a senior editor of **Reader's Digest** for many years. See Lyons, **Assignment in Utopia**, and Bassow, **The Moscow Correspondents**, pp. 85-90.

83. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on July 26, 1927. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 176, l. 74.

84. K. Bickel (unsigned) to J. G. Doletzky on March 19, 1932. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 462, ll. 55-57.

85. Read, The Power of News, p. 174.

86. Draft Minutes on June 30, 1931. R/RJBF 3.

87. K. Bickel to J. G. Doletzky on May 12, 1933. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 623, ll. 1-7.

88. K. Bickel to R. W. Howard on June 28, 1933. LC/RWH collection.

89. J. G. Doletzky to K. Durant on June 13, 1933. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 597, l. 30.

90. Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States, p. 123.

91. TASS agreed to pay a comission of 2,227 (contemporary value 62,044) pounds to each agency. The agreement was signed in Paris on 22 December, 1933 by Murray, Meynot and Doletzky. R/1/8712405.

92. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on February 2, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 651, l. 13.

93. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on January 25, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 651, ll. 1-6.

94. K. Cooper to F. B. Noyes on February 4, 1934. IU/The KC papers. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on February 10, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 651, ll. 17-18.

95. K. Bickel to E. L. Keen on February 8, 1934. See also K. Bickel to R. W. Howard on February 9, 1934. LC/RWH collection.

96. Bickel was at first hesitant to sign the agreement, because "it meant that Kent was offering to agree to do exactly what we had always done and which we had been insisting in speeches and articles for years was the thing a press association ought to do." K. Bickel to E. L. Keen on February 14, 1934. LC/RWH collection.

97. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on February 13, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 651, ll. 17-18; Read, **The Power of News**, p. 176.

98. K. Bickel to E. Keen on February 14, 1934. LC/RWH collection.

99. Kent Cooper's travel arrangements aroused a lot of attention inside TASS. "Kent ordered a single room for himself and a double bed for his wife and secretary, and the Russian crowd are still trying to work that out. They wirelessed Kent at sea for confirmation on the double bed room for `wife and secretary' and telephoned again yesterday, J. G. insisting that KD must be mistaken. KD said that they could understand Kent sleeping with his secretary without any mental strain, or sleeping with his wife, but they couldn't figure out Kent sleeping by himself and having his secretary sleep with his wife. They don't understand how conventional a people we are." K. Bickel to Robert J. Bender on March 26, 1934. LC/RWH collection. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on February 23, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 651, 1. 27.

100. K. Bickel to R. W. Howard on March 13, 1934. LC/RWH collection. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on February 23, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 651, ll. 20, 27; Cooper, **Barriers Down**, pp. 270-271.

101. J. H. Furay to R. W. Howard on March 14, 1934; K. Bickel to H. Baillie on March 23, 1934. LC/RWH collection. J. G. Doletzky to K. Cooper on May 5, 1934. IU/KC papers; J. G. Doletzky to K. Durant on September 29, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 650, l. 172; A. Meynot to W. Murray on August 29, 1934. AN/5AR 419, 76.

102. K. Durant to J. G. Doletzky on May 2, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 651, l. 30.

103. Proces-verbal des pourparlers entre M. Doletzky, Directeur de l'agence Tass et les representants des agences Havas et Reuter, M.M. Meynot et Murray, le 17-19 août 1934 en Moscou (confidentiel). GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 688, ll. 26-46 and AN/5AR 419, 76.

104. The agreement was signed in Paris on October 22, 1934. AN/5AR 416, 1, 50; R/8712405; Morris, **Deadline Every Minute**, p. 178.

105. J. G. Doletzky to K. Bickel on November 2, 1934, K. Cooper to J. G. Doletzky on November 3, 1934; K. Bickel to J. G. Doletzky on November 3, 1934; Two-Party-Contract between the AP and TASS (unsigned). IU/KC papers.

106. Doletzky visited with the TASS bureau in New York, President Roosevelt in Washington and also went to Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles and San Fransisco. His scholarly interests led him to Columbia and Yale, and at New Haven he took in a football game with Karl Bickel. The game was incomprehensible to Doletzky, but he was impressed with the Bowl's press box and the direct telegraph lines to the newspapers for the reporters' play-by-play reports. He took many notes on the operation. Kruglak, **The Two Faces of TASS**, p. 28; I. M. Lapitskii, "Shtrikhi raznykh let," **TASS soobshsaet**, p. 91; TASS Director Sails for Moscow; Has Exchange Hook-Up with U.P.," **Editor & Publisher**, December 1, 1934, p. 12.

107. J. G. Doletzky to K. Durant on March 6, 1936. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 794, 1. 91.

108. Hugh Baillie (1890-1966) joined the UP in San Francisco in 1915 after six years of general newspaper experience, principally on the old Los Angeles Herald and Los Angeles Record. Then he worked in several UP bureaus and became news manager in 1920. In 1926 he was appointed general business manager and in 1927 vice-president. "Baillie, Bender and Miller Are Promoted by United Press," Editor & Publisher, July 16, 1927, p. 16. About Baillie's experiences in the Soviet Union in 1935, see Baillie, High Tension, pp. 100-109.

109. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence. The History of Soviet Foreign

Howard Interviews Stalin

### Policy, 1917-67 (London: Secker & Warting, 1968), pp. 239-241.

110. Although Radek's subsequent fate is uncertain, the available evidence indicates that he was sent to a labor camp in the Arctic region and was murdered in 1939 by another prisoner, a criminal rather than political offender. Radek was rehabilitated on June 13, 1988; Warth, "Radek, Karl," p. 143; A Biographical Dictionary of the Soviet Union 1917-1988, p. 343; Robert Conquest, The Great Terror. Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (London: MacMillan, 1968), p. 156; Adam B. Ulam, Stalin. The Man and His Era (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 422-426; Stephen A. deMowbray, Key Facts in Soviet History Vol 1: 1917-1941 (London: Printer Publishers, 1990), pp. 307-308; "Capital Friends of Romm to Call Soviet Ambassador," The Washington Post, January 25, 1937; "Washington Journalists Plead for Romm, Accused by Soviet," The Washington Post, January 27, 1937; Kruglak, The Two Faces of TASS, pp. 31-32.

111. J. G. Doletzky to K. Durant on March 11, 1927, and on April 2, 1934. GARF f. 4459, op. 11, d. 903, 11, 54 and 72.

112. It has been estimated that 62 percent of the top level diplomats and commissariat officials fell in the purge. Teddy J. Uldricks, "The Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs," **Slavic Review** No 2 (June, 1977), p. 190. According to one estimate, about 10,000 Poles from Moscow alone were shot in 1938 with a total of 50,000 in the country as a whole. From 1937 to 1939 all 12 members of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party present in Russia were executed. Conquest, **The Great Terror**, pp. 433-434.

113. On Doletzky's fate see Joseph E. Davies, **Mission to Moscow** (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941), pp. 168-169; Alexander Barmine, **One Who Survived**. The Life Story of a Russian under the Soviets (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), p. 638; Lyons, **Assignment in Utopia**, p. 44; Kruglak, **The Two Faces of TASS**, p. 30; Lapitskii, "Shtrikhi rasnykh let," p. 94; Hanjoachim Höhne, **Report über Nachrichtenagenturen**. 2. Die Geschichte der Nachricht und ihrer Verbreiter (Baden-Baden: Nomos Gesellschaft, 1977), p. 103. Doletzky's son, Professor S. J. Doletzky, revealed that Doletzky shot himself because he learned from his Polish friends that the KGB was coming to arrest him. He left three letters: one to his son, one to Stalin and one to his Polish friend. In the letter to his son he wrote: "I am an honest communist. Take care of your mother. When you get older you will understand why I did this." Nobody knows where he was buried. Despite S. J. Doletzky's requests, the KGB has refused to reveal the material concerning his father's death. J. G. Doletzky has so far not been re-habilitated. Interview with S. J. Doletzky on July 30, 1993.

114. Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon. Telecommunications and International Politics 1851-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 189-190; Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 87.

115. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, **The international news agencies** (London: Constable, 1980), p. 161.

116. G. D. Petrovich, "Tverskoi bul'var, 10" TASS soobshsaet, p. 130.

117. Kent Cooper, Barriers Down: The Story of the News Agency Epoch (New York: Kennikat Press, 1942); S. Iwanaga, Story of Japanese News Agencies. A Historic Account: From Meijii Restoration (1868) to The End of World War II (1945) (Tokyo: Shinbun Tsushin Chosa-Kai, 1980).

118. Obviously Bickel did not remember the correct year. It was in 1934 when he and Cooper visited Moscow. K. Bickel to R. W. Howard on April 4, 1952. IU/RWH archive.